Adolph – Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics; the Myth of Neutrality (2013)

While central banks are widely perceived as objective and independent institutions that operate solely in the public interest, Christopher Adolph’s book, “Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics; the Myth of Neutrality,” challenges this notion. Adolph asserts that central banks are political entities vulnerable to influence from both government officials and bankers. He contends that central bankers are not impartial policymakers but rather individuals with their own interests and biases that significantly impact their decisions.

To substantiate his argument, Adolph meticulously examines the political processes involved in appointing central bankers, the decision-making structures within central banks, and the interactions between central banks and other political actors. He unveils that central bankers are often appointed through political channels and that their decisions are swayed by the concerns of both government officials and bankers.

Adolph’s book unveils the political nature of central banks and the need for greater accountability and transparency to ensure that they operate in the best interests of the public. His work challenges the conventional perception of central banks and provides a more nuanced understanding of their role in the economy.